Telegrammi da Roma_9_10

Il Caso Calipari è stata una delle patate bollenti più scottanti che il governo Berlusconi ha dovuto affrontare in questi ultimi anni per ciò che concerne la politica estera.

Al di là delle apparenze i telegrammi dell'ambasciata usa confermano che la volontà del governo italiano sia stata quella di "superare" l'incidente e cercare il più in fretta possibile di dimenticare e ristabilire quanto prima gli ottimi rapporti esistenti tra i due paesi.

ID:	32245
Date:	2005-05-09 15:53:00
Origin:	05ROME1593
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	SECRET
Dunno:	05ROME1506
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 091553Z May 05
S E C R E T ROME 001593 SIPDIS BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO BG VANGJEL; JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI IN PARLIAMENT ON CALIPARI- STRESSES GOOD RELATIONS AND COOPERATION WITH US, COMMITMENT TO IRAQ; ALSO MENTIONS WITHDRAWAL PLANS REF: ROME 1506 Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 b and d. 1. (S) Summary and Recommendation: On May 5-6, PM Berlusconi spoke to both houses of Parliament about the joint investigation and separate reports of the March 4 shooting of Italian Intelligence officer Nicola Calipari by US forces near Baghdad. While Berlusconi defended the Italian report and took issue with some of the US report's findings (see synopsis of his remarks at para 3), he reaffirmed the points of most importance to us: the incident was unintentional; US-Italy relations and our alliance remain strong; and Italy remains committed to its involvement in Iraq. We continue to recommend letting the US report speak for us rather than prolonging public debate. While the issue appears to be losing steam here, we still must deal with the MLAT requests and the possibility of a continuing investigation by Italian prosecutors. End summary and recommendation 2. (U) On May 5, PM Berlusconi briefed the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the Italian and US reports that concluded the work of the joint investigation in to the March 4 shooting of Italian Intelligence officer Nicola Calipari by US forces near Baghdad. Berlusconi, in televised session, was flanked by FM Fini and other cabinet ministers. A debate followed. A synopsis of his remarks, as reported in the Chamber of Deputies transcript follows (his report to the Senate was nearly identical). 3. (U) Begin synopsis of transcript: The impossibility of reaching shared conclusions....certainly mean that the joint investigation...was not able to bring its task to full completion. Nonetheless, it is also true that the US decision to open a joint investigation with Italy is unprecedented and came in response to a request by the Italian government. Investigations were objectively conditioned by the lack of preservation of the scene of the incident. This notwithstanding, the work of the joint investigation team was carried out in a climate of strong mutual cooperation and the Italian members of the team had full access to -- and were enabled to acquire -- all the information available. Discrepancies between the Italian and American reports turned out to be irreducible and I will certainly not be the one to minimize the size of the disagreement. Discrepancies in the two texts touch on aspects that are far from being marginal. The US considered reliable testimony and data that do not coincide with what we collected and which we found were reliable. In particular, the declarations by the two Italian survivors are in contrast with those by the US military. Given that the impartiality and good faith of the US investigators cannot be under discussion, and I think we all agree on this, we cannot but respect their conclusions, noting that they do not coincide with ours. This is even the opinion of the Americans on our results and also, their report converges with ours on this -- it recognizes that not everything worked as it should have in preparing/locating and managing that blocking position. Both sides, however, recognize that the incident was unintentional and both sides recognize the need to take concrete operational measures to avoid similar occurrences in the future. Still, one thing is to conclude like the Americans did, because of disciplinary measures, and another is to underscore, as we did -- and I quote -- on the basis of acquired evidence that there was a lack of intention . The absence of criminal intent -- the intention -- does not rule out the guilt/responsibility that is ascribable to negligence, imprudence or even simply inexperience. And this, you will agree, is not a small difference. The Italian report concluded that the blocking positions was irregular. It was set up with no written or specific instructions and was located where it had little visibility and could not protect the security of the military manning it nor that of drivers of vehicles approaching it. Accusations and criticism of the Government for how it managed the Calipari case and for the conclusion of the joint investigation are paradoxical. If we believe one vision of the facts is credible rather than another, it evidently cannot be friendship to make one change one's mind. This is elementary and holds true for both the US and Italy. The friendship between Italy and the US is not under discussion. The alliance and the friendship with the United states have solid foundations, foundations that we are committed to consolidating every day against the threat of totalitarianism and terrorism. Our friendship has overcome even more difficult tests. To this day, Italy recognizes itself in the Le Monde headline after the 9/11 tragedy that read, "We are all Americans." Our commitment to do what is possible to ascertain the truth and possible responsibilities remains unchanged. It is a commitment we intend to honor, first and foremost for the respect we owe to the memory of Nicola Calipari. The Italian judiciary can count on the firm support of the Government. I want to free the ground from any misunderstanding: there is no connection between the investigation into the circumstances of the death of Calipari and the continuation of the Italian commitment toward reconstruction in Iraq...We do not intend to establish any kind of link between the assessment of the event in which our official lost his life and Italy's role in Iraq. Italy is in Iraq in compliance with a UN Security Council Resolution. End synopsis of transcript. 4. (U) In response to press questions after the debate, Berlusconi said: The Center-Left opposition's attitude was "responsible," because they did not place under discussion the alliance nor the friendship with the US. The opposition continues to ask for our withdrawal from Iraq, which is in the plans, in agreement with the Iraq government and the allies. In the past, we have made announcements to this effect and we hold to this prospect. There is no reason today to say, "everybody home." It would sound irresponsible and incomprehensible. On the progressive withdrawal of troops from Iraq we already announced our position some time ago. We already discussed it with our main allies. We will continue to talk with them. A progressive reduction of our presence will certainly occur. I had even given an indication of when. Everything will be in agreement with the Iraqi government and with our allies. I even spoke about it directly and personally with Bush and Blair. Therefore, we continue in this direction. An international conference on Iraq will soon take place. Italian efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq are not isolated and even NATO and the EU are now involved. 5. (S) COMMENT: Berlusconi's remarks, while reassuring on Iraq and on US-Italy relations, also reflect a position he and his government staked out on the Calipari case from the beginning: a commitment to fix responsibility. Although this commitment was not actually included in the joint investigation's terms of reference, Berlusconi evidently felt an obligation to adhere to it. We believe this was at the heart of US-Italian disagreements over the joint investigation conclusions and set the tone of both the Italian report and Berlusconi's remarks to Parliament. In particular, the determination to avoid any criticism of Calipari's own role led the Italian government and investigators to ignore a question that seemed obvious to the US investigation: out of the 30 cars that came to the blocking position, why was this the only car fired upon that night? As in Reftel, we continue to urge Washington to discourage USG spokespeople from point-by-point refutation of the Italian report or Berlusconi's remarks. As much as possible, we should allow our report to speak for itself on our view of the incident. This will hasten the fading of the case from the political radar screen. 6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. SEMBLER NNNN 2005ROME01593 - Classification: SECRET

ID:	31909
Date:	2005-05-03 15:18:00
Origin:	05ROME1506
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	SECRET
Dunno:
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 031518Z May 05
S E C R E T ROME 001506 SIPDIS BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO BG VANGJEL; JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI TRYING TO PUT CALIPARI INCIDENT BEHIND US - ITALIAN REPORT FINDS NO INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY Classified By: Ambassador Mel Sembler, reasons 1.4 b and d. 1. (S) Summary and Recommendation: Just prior to the May 2 release of the Italian report on the March 4 killing of intelligence officer Nicola Calipari at a U.S. checkpoint in Baghdad, Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to PM Berlusconi's office to receive an advance copy of the report and to hear from senior GOI officials their view of the way forward. The Italians stressed that the GOI wanted to put the incident behind us, that it would not damage our strong friendship and alliance, and that it would not affect the Italian commitment in Iraq. The Italians said that while U.S. cooperation with Italy in the joint investigation had been total and thoroughly professional, Italy had to stand by the Italian reconstruction of the March 4 incident. The Italian report, they said, concluded that the shooting was not intentional and that no individual responsibility could be assigned for the shooting, thus making the magistrate's criminal investigation less likely to develop into a full criminal case. 2. (S) Recommendation (see also Para 9): While the Italian report quibbles with many findings and much of the methodology of the US AR 15-6 report on the incident, we will be best served by resisting the temptation to attack the Italian version point-by-point, and should instead continue to let our report speak for itself. While our instinct at Post is to defend the U.S. report and criticize the Italian one, we realize the consequences of doing so could be asymmetrical: while the criticism in the Italian report is unlikely to have serious negative consequences for the USG, if the GOI appears to be disloyal to its public servants - or to be rolling over to please the USG in this matter, the consequences for Berlusconi's government and Italy's commitment in Iraq could be severe. Therefore, we strongly recommend all USG spokespeople stand by the 15-6 report while refraining from detailed criticism of the Italian draft. End Summary and Recommendation. 3. (S) Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to the PM's office late May 2 to receive an advance copy of the Italian report on the March 4 Calipari incident, based on the joint investigation carried out with the U.S., and to hear from senior GOI officials their views on the matter. Present on the Italian side were FM Fini, U/S Letta, PM Dip Advisor (NSA equivalent and Ambassador-designate to the US) Castellaneta, SISMI Chief Pollari, a few of their senior aides, and the two Italian investigators BG Campregher and MFA official Ragaglini. (Berlusconi himself was not at the meeting and, we believe, was out of Rome until the next morning.) 4. (S) The Italians made the following main points: -- The intent of Italian Government is that this incident should have no negative effect on our excellent bilateral relations. -- Specifically, there should be no effect on the Italian commitment in Iraq. -- The Italian government wants to put the incident behind us and hopes this report will contribute to that end (see below for explanation as to how it will serve that purpose). -- An unclassified version of report would be posted on a GOI web site May 2, with classified sections redacted. The full, classified report would be given only to PM Berlusconi, but the USG could have a copy on request after Berlusconi sees it. -- Berlusconi would discuss the report in Parliament on Thursday, May 5. -- It would be useful for President Bush to call Berlusconi Wednesday, so that he could say before Parliament the next day that he had spoken with the President about the matter. 5. (S) As to the report itself, the Italians generally described it as supporting the "tragic accident" thesis, and highlighted the following: -- The report says it is impossible to attribute individual responsibility for the killing. -- It also says Italian investigators found no evidence that killing was intentional. -- This last point was designed specifically to discourage further investigation by the prosecuting magistrates, since under Italian law they apparently can investigate cases of intentional homicide against Italian citizens outside of Italy, but not cases of unintentional homicide. (NOTE: Our contacts warn that Italian magistrates are infamous for bending such laws to suit their purposes, so it remains to be seen whether the GOI tactic will work in this regard.) Also, Castellaneta told us later that the GOI was hoping the prosecutors would find that, because the killing was unintentional, there would not be grounds for a case of "excessive legitimate defense." -- The Italian report was written with prosecuting magistrates in mind. The Italians stressed that USA 15-6 regulations permitted some things to be covered in the joint investigation but not others, while Italian magistrates had broader scope that had to be satisfied. -- The government will block attempts by parliamentary committees to open their own investigations (there are already several calls for this from the opposition), on the grounds that this report answers questions sufficiently. -- The report stands behind the accounts given by Sgrena, the driver, and SISMI's Baghdad Station Chief; i.e., the "Italian reconstruction" of the incident. 6. (S) The copy of 67-page Italian report that they handed to us was a draft that was still being proofread in another room (in fact, they said it was the only hard copy in existence, and they swapped out a couple pages during the meeting as typos were corrected). We have translated and e-mailed to State EUR/WE high points (see para 10) and faxed the complete text in Italian to State EUR/WE. Our quick scan indicates that there are several pages in which the Italian investigators take issue with specific facts and findings in the USA 15-6 report, generally on the grounds that the accounts of the Italian witnesses differed significantly from those of the American soldiers. There is also an extensive critique of the inadequacy of SOPs for Traffic control Points and Blocking Positions. It argues that more complete notification to US authorities would not have changed the outcome. In a subsequent meeting with the DCM, Castellaneta said the main difference in the reports was that the US report focused on communications while the Italian report focused on preparation of the soldiers and the stress under which they were operating. The final conclusions, though, are as stated by the Italians in our meeting: no individual responsibility, no deliberate intent. 7. (S) Ambassador Sembler told the Italians that the USG shared the Italian desire to put this incident behind us and not let it affect overall bilateral relations. In that regard, it was important for the Italian government not to point accusing fingers at the U.S. or complain about lack of cooperation, and we would endeavor to continue doing so ourselves . Fini said Italy could not complain about cooperation from U.S.; the Italian report clarified that the Italian investigators had full access and he would ask Berlusconi to stress that fact in parliament on May 5. Ragaglini and BG Campregher were effusive about the "total and complete" cooperation they received from the USA investigators, including access to all evidence. The one caveat was that for five days before they arrived in Baghdad BG Vangjel had been conducting interviews within the USA chain of command re communications and U.S. knowledge of the rescue operation. The Italians, however, were given copies of everything done prior to their arrival. 8. (S) The Italians were clearly not happy about the classified portions of the USA 15-6 posted on the web being "unredacted" so easily and asked the Ambassador for an explanation. They did not push the issue after he explained it was solely a technical mistake. The Italians said they had pulled from Baghdad the SISMI Station Chief whose name was revealed in the "unredacted" version of the 15-6; he will not go back. 9. (S) Embassy recommendations for immediate next steps: -- The NSC should try to schedule a POTUS-Berlusconi call on Wednesday. -- The USG public reaction for now should be limited to "We've just received Italian report and are studying it." (Italian press will be furiously nit-picking, and it will not serve a useful purpose for us to get into point-by-point refutation at this stage, although we might want to do backgrounders later in Baghdad, Washington, or Rome.) -- The Department should consider a SecState-Fini call in the next few days to confirm that we share Italy's desire to put incident behind us. 10. (U) Informal Embassy Translation of Italian Report's Conclusions: "The Italian representatives - based on the evidence they were able to obtain - did not find elements that would allege that the facts indicate deliberate murder. It is realistic that tension felt by the soldiers and some inexperience and stress may have made them react instinctively and with little control. The lack of formal references to clear rules that should have been observed makes it problematic to assign specific individual responsibilities. The facts asserted by Ms. Sgrena, the car's driver and the SISMI Chief of Station in Baghdad can be considered realistic. Based on the overall analysis, their reconstruction is coherent and plausible." End Informal Embassy Translation of Conclusions. 11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. SEMBLER NNNN 2005ROME01506 - Classification: SECRET

Telegrammi da Roma_8

Silvio contro Facebook...all'imperatore con i rialzi e il cerone in ta faccia non piace il social network e men che meno i gruppi che inneggiano ad una sua prematura dipartita! (nella foto babyface bambino).

In this cable durante una cena di lavoro (no Maione ho detto Cena non Pranzo) con l'ambasciatore ammerigano tra una tartina al caviale e un bicchierino di schhhhhhampain si parla anche di Iran e relazioni Usa-Italia...

ID:	242287
Date:	2010-01-01 15:02:00
Origin:	10ROME1
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXRO9499 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #0001/01 0011502 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 011502Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3072 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 3953 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 0393 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 4177
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000001 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, IT SUBJECT: VISITING WITH A RECUPERATING BERLUSCONI ROME 00000001 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. C) Summary: The Ambassador visited recuperating Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at his Lombardy estate for a private luncheon December 30. The Ambassador had suggested he visit Berlusconi after the Prime Minister was assaulted at a Milan rally in mid-December. Accompanied by Gianni Letta, the Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office and effectively Berlusconi's second in command, Ambassador flew up for the meeting on the Prime Minister's plane. Bandaged and bruised from the December attack, Berlusconi was nonetheless upbeat and eager to show off his new project for training Italy's elite and share his thoughts on European leaders and domestic politics. Berlusconi was effusive about U.S.-Italian relations and Letta promised action on roping in ENI operations in Iran and pushing ahead on Megaports. End Summary The Recuperating Prime Minister ------------------------------- 2. C) Following the Ambassador's call to Gianni Letta suggesting the Ambassador visit the Prime Minister during his recuperation, Letta, the Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Office, invited Ambassador Thorne to accompanied him to Milan on December 30 for a private afternoon with the Prime Minister. The three hour session, held in Italian, involved only the Prime Minister, Letta and the Ambassador, and included a visit to Berlusconi's latest endeavor, a private training school for Italy's elite, and a wide-ranging lunch with the two top decision makers in the Italian government. 3. C) Berlusconi was still bandaged and scarred from the assault in early December where a mentally unstable man hurled a die cast model of Milan's cathedral at his head. Berlusconi noted that the missile had struck a glancing blow to his cheek, cutting him, breaking his nose and some of his teeth, but if it had hit him straight on "it would have killed" him. Letta recounted separately that Berlusconi had slumped into a depression following the attack - "he's an impresario, he wants everyone to love him " - but that had snapped out of it and was on the mend. Letta also noted that their tour of Berlusconi's new project site was the Prime Minister's first excursion outdoors since his release from the hospital. U.S.-Italy: A Prized Relationship --------------------------------- 4. C) In luncheon discussions, Berlusconi unabashedly stated that he prized Italy's relationship with the U.S. and that his government stood ready to help us, whatever the issue. He noted that Italy owed the United States a debt of gratitude for salvation during World War II, and for protection throughout the Cold War. On Afghanistan, basing issues, and other tough problems, Italy was committed to helping the U.S. get to the right solution. He noted that he hoped that the Italian increase in Afghanistan would help President Obama and address the situation on the ground. Berlusconi on European Leaders ------------------------------ 5. C) The Prime Minister and Letta also gave their run down of current European political leadership. Berlusconi assessed that Sarkozy's star was clearly waning in European circles and that the French President did not command the same influence he did a year ago. Letta was less convinced, noting to the Ambassador that both Berlusconi and Sarkozy were "big dogs angling for the same spotlight." Berlusconi recounted how he had played an instrumental role in the Spring in persuading a reluctant Erdogan to accept Danish PM Rasmussen as the new NATO Secretary General, overcoming the Turkish President's profound irritation at Rasmussen for not silencing Kurdish language radio stations despite numerous requests. On Russia, Berlusconi felt that Putin and Medvedev got along well, respected each other, and had an effective relationship. In fact, farewells after lunch were unexpectedly cut short by an incoming call from Putin. Iran: Appalled by violence, Will try to rope in ENI --------------------------------------------- ------ 6. C) On Iran, Berlusconi noted that he was appalled by the Iranian crackdown. He offered the capabilities of the Italian intelligence services and assured full sharing of information gathered on the internal dynamics in Tehran. Letta, as the supervising authority over Italy's intelligence services, assured the Ambassador of a continuation of our ROME 00000001 002.2 OF 003 already excellent bilateral cooperation on the issue. Letta also promised that he would talk to ENI CEO Scaroni about the energy giant's ongoing operations in Iran and, if he could, persuade them to halt activities. Megaports - GOI to determine POC -------------------------------- 7. C) In response to the U.S. request to move forward on Megaports, Letta told the Ambassador that the issue would be discussed at the Council of Ministers meeting on January 8 and that they would be in contact soon thereafter to convey which ministry would have lead in the GOI for implementing the project and as such be the primary interlocutor for our Embassy. Italy's Courts - Problem Number One ----------------------------------- 8. C) Berlusconi forthrightly identified the magistratura - Italy's judiciary and courts -- as Italy's "biggest problem" and told the Ambassador that he was ready to forge an alliance with the center left opposition to implement judicial reform. He noted that a legal system where issues were never definitively resolved -- where you can be absolved of a crime and yet have the case resurrected later - sapped Italy's political and economic system. He argued that this is what has happened in his own case, where he has been cleared in the past but the same charges keep on returning repeatedly. He said that he had allies in the opposition on the need for reform, including PD Leader Bersani. Letta cautioned the government won't know if it has the clout to deliver on such an idea unless it secures a decent showing in regional elections in March 2010. Smart Guys in the Opposition ---------------------------- 9. C) Berlusconi and Letta displayed a great deal of respect for opposition leaders. Berlusconi praised the Democratic Party Leader, Pier Luigi Bersani as a "straight shooter" who was fair with a top rate intellect. Separately Letta was also complimentary about former Prime Minister (and archrival) Massimo D'Alema who he credited with showing courage and integrity during the Balkans crisis and taking some very tough decisions. Letta noted that D'Alema's prickliness and "smartest guy in the room" demeanor made dealing with him a chore, but acknowledged his judgment and political effectiveness, which was why Berlusconi backed him for the EU Foreign Minister position despite their differences. Letta told the Ambassador that he did not have a clear judgment on how DiPietro will play in domestic politics and looked forward to future conversations. On other domestic political issues, Letta thought that the current estrangement between the governing PDL party and Sicilian President Lombardo was a minor issue and they would patch it up quickly. Worried about a flat 2010 ------------------------- 10. C) Both Berlusconi and Letta expressed concern about the limited prospects for economic growth in 2010. Berlusconi thought that Italy had weathered the past year of the financial crisis fairly well but thought it would be a challenge to produce enough growth in 2010 to start replacing jobs lost. The Prime Minister was less concerned that a financial meltdown in Greece would have EU-wide impact. He said that he had a good relationship with Greek PM Papendreou and was confident that he could right the situation. New Media - Important for Liberty --------------------------------- 11. C) In response to the Ambassador's questions to the Prime Minister about the role of the internet, Berlusconi shot back "it's important for liberty." New media - particularly Facebook which has been instrumental in the past month in organizing a national "No Berlusconi Day" and more controversially in continuing to host "Kill Berlusconi" pages - has vexed the GOI, - but the Prime Minister stated that he felt the evolving media was both critical to the future and also to the preservation of liberty. But he felt there needed to be better tuned controls to prevent the most extreme use of the new outlets. The Berlusconi Leadership Academy --------------------------------- 12. C) The Prime Minister commenced the visit by personally ROME 00000001 003.2 OF 003 conducting a guided tour of his most recent project, a private academy to train Italy's brightest young minds. Berlusconi led Letta and the Ambassador on a personal tour of a newly rehabbed Lombardy estate that will serve as the home of the enterprise. The completely renovated 17th century country mansion, Villa Gernetto, will house a special school set to open in March for one hundred of Italy's most talented young leaders, completely funded from Berlusconi's personal fortune. The Prime Minister intends to choose the students himself and he envisions an environment where Italy's best and brightest live and study, taught by world leaders "like Blair and Clinton." Comment ------- 13. C) The Ambassador's intimate afternoon with Italy's two top decision makers was both a testament to the priority Berlusconi gives the U.S.-Italy relationship but also perhaps a sign that the GOI has achieved its long-sought level comfort and ease with the Obama administration. It is also a dividend of the Ambassador's cultivation of the relationship with Letta, which has opened up a personal channel to the Prime Minister. The Italian press coverage of the following day clearly took this message from what they viewed as an extraordinary private session. The Prime Minister was clear that he expects to be called upon to deliver for the U.S., which he will do out of principle, not self-interest. Despite being given numerous openings, neither the Prime Minister nor Letta asked for anything from the U.S. during the lengthy luncheon. A striking aspect of the session was Letta's clear position as co-regent, with Berlusconi deferring regularly to his colleague and with Letta airing opposing points of view to his boss during the luncheon. THORNE

Telegrammi da Roma_7

Malgrado il nostro presidente del consiglio sia da sempre stato avverso alla tecnologia e ad internet (si sa lui è un galantuomo d'altri tempi) non sembra però essergli sfuggita l'importanza del controllo del più importante mezzo di comunicazione. La legge Romani mirava per questo a regolarizzare o regolamentare l'uso di internet in Italia...secondo l'ambasciata Usa si tratta di una legge talmente dura e ai confini della legalità da poter essere presa da esempio dai censuratori per antonomasia (secondo loro, beninteso) : i Cinesi.


Questa legge viene definita come un vero e proprio strumento di controllo e censura rivolta soprattutto a siti come Blogspot e Youtube; un legge ormai entrata in vigore da marzo 2010 che tanto per cambiare favorirebbe le imprese del premier limitando la libera circolazione delle informazioni.
Il famoso tentativo di obbligare ogni blogger ad avere il carnet di giornalista viene definito da Thorne (l'ambasciatore gringo) come un'azione "infame"

ID:	247055
Date:	2010-02-03 16:28:00
Origin:	10ROME125
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:	09ROME143
Destination:	VZCZCXRO5383 RR RUEHFL RUEHNP DE RUEHRO #0125/01 0341628 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031628Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3211 INFO RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 4007 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0454 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 4237 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000125 SIPDIS STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR JENNIFER CHOE GROVES, ERIN MCCONAHA, CHRISTOPHER WILSON STATE PLEASE PASS TO PHILLIP VERVEER STATE PLEASE PASS TO EEB/TPP/IPE FOR TOM O'KEEFE, JOELLEN URBAN COMMERCE PLEASE PASS TO SUSAN WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020 TAGS: ECPS, ETTC, KIPR, EINT, IT SUBJECT: OPPONENTS OF ITALIAN INTERNET BILL SAY IT STIFLES FREE SPEECH, THREATENS DEMOCRACY REF: 09 ROME 0143 Classified By: Classified by DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Opponents of a new bill before Italian parliament that would further regulate the Internet say it endangers free speech and is a threat to Italian democracy. The bill also appears to favor PM Berlusconi's Mediaset television service while disadvantaging Sky, one of its major competitors. The GOI says the bill is intended to implement an EU directive that harmonizes media regulation and that the provisions being criticised are designed to establish greater protection of copyrighted material, to protect children from inappropriate broadcasts, and to keep consumers from paying twice by being subjected to excessive advertising on pay-TV channels. Opponents say the law far exceeds the scope and spirit of the EU law and severely restricts free expression on the Internet. Due to advertising and content regulation in the bill, some have read it as an effort to give Berlusconi greater control over communication and to drive out Mediaset's competitors. Implementation of the bill has been postponed from its original date of January 27 and parliament is holding hearings on the matter. The GOI appears open to discussion of the bill's text. While reaction to the bill has been strong among opposition politicians and telecom professionals, the issue has not made it to the front pages of newspapers so there has been no strong public reation. Despite GOI protestations, the bill is troubling as it appears to have been written to give the government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet content. END SUMMARY 2. (SBU) According to the GOI, the Romani Bill (named for Paolo Romani, Deputy Economic Development Minister, who covers communications issues) is designed to implement EU Directive 2007/65CE, which aims to harmonize media regulation in the EU. Many telecom sector professionals, however, believe that the bill vastly exceeds the scope and spirit of the EU law. The bill is complex, but there are three primary areas of concern: limits to uploading on the Interet, television advertising ceilings, and limits to content aimed for adults, which would also restrict films judged by the Italian rating system as being for those 14 and older. This would likely include the vast majority if not all U.S.-produced PG-13 movies. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LIABILITY FOR VIDEO ON THE INTERNET - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. (U) Provisions contained in the bill would make Internet service providers (ISPs), and hosting sites such as Blogspot and YouTube, liable for content in the same way a television station is. In the strictest interpretation of the law, the sites and ISPs would have to monitor all content on their sites, content which is uploaded by millions of individual users. This is widely viewed as impossible both in practical and economic terms. The Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM) would be responsible for oversight of the law, and some have interpreted the bill as requiring government permission before a video could be uploaded. 4. (C) Antonello Busetto, director of institutional relations for Confindustria Servizi Innovativi e Tecnologici, a business association representing the interests of IT companies, said the measure would mean "the death of the Internet in Italy." 5. (U) Italian communications commissioner Nicola D'Angelo was quoted in the press as saying, "Italy will be the only Western country in which it is necessary to have prior government permission to operate this kind of service...This aspect reveals a democratic risk, regardless of who happens to be in power." Likewise, AGCOM president Corrado Calabro has said that Italy would be unique in the West as imposing Internet restrictions until now only imposed by authoritarian governments. 6. (SBU) The GOI says the measure is aimed at protecting copyrighted material from being uploaded and downloaded ROME 00000125 002 OF 003 illegally, as well as at monitoring other potentially illegal activity on the Internet. The copyright industry has expressed some limited approval of the bill. Enzo Mazza, president of the Italian Music Federation, said the music industry is generally in favor of making ISPs and sites more responsible for protecting copyrighted material, though, he added that his industry's analysis of the bill was focused on this aspect and not other implications. 7. (SBU) Because this could make ISPs and opinion sites liable for defamation in the way television broadcasts are, some see this as an effort to control political discourse on the Internet. Others see a commercial angle aimed at limiting the video and TV available on the Internet as Mediaset moves into the Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) market. Alessandro Gilioli, who writes a blog for the liberal weekly magazine Espresso wrote "It's the Berlusconi method: Kill your potential enemies while they are small. That's why anyone doing Web TV -- even from their attic at home -- must get ministerial approval and fulfill a host of other bureaucratic obligations." 8. (SBU) AGCOM would have the authority to enforce the law. Among the authority's powers would be the ability to block traffic into Italy of sites whose content did not meet the requirements of the law. For example, YouTube could be blocked because the content was not uploaded with government approval. AGCOM would also be able to levy fines of up to 150,000 euros against foreign companies violating the law. Though AGCOM is theoretically an independent agency, many fear that it may not be strong enough to resist political pressure. - - - - - - - - - - - ADVERTISING CEILINGS - - - - - - - - - - - 9. (C) The bill would place limits on advertising on pay-TV channels that exceed the EU directive. It would reduce the EU ceiling of 20% to 12% in Italy by 2012. The provision would penalize Sky in particular. Some argue that the measure is designed to favor PM Berlusconi's free-to-air Mediaset channels, which would not be subject to the limit. Mediaset's pay channels would be subject to the advertising ceiling, but Mediaset's channels currently have less than 12% each hour dedicated to ads. In addition, reducing the overall possibility to advertise on pay-TV would push advertising towards free channels operated by Mediaset and by the Italian state network RAI. Busetto said this would allow Berlusconi to earn more money and also to exercise greater control of public information. - - - - - - - - - ADULT CONTENT - - - - - - - - - 10. (SBU) The bill places stringent time restrictions on broadcasting of so-called "adult content," virtually prohibiting it between 7 a.m. and 11 p.m. Pay channels such as those offered by Sky would be subject to the restrictions; it appears pay-per-view content would be as well. Because they obtain a significant part of their income from pay adult content, pay-TV would suffer financially from this restriction. The bill would limit broadcast of any film rated for viewers above age 14 to after 10:30 p.m. One press report said this would make films such as Saturday Night Fever unavailable until late-night. Again, some opponents worry that the objective is to hurt Mediaset's competition. - - - - - - - - EU OPINION - - - - - - - - 11. (U) Opinion at the EU appears to be conflicting. According to press reports, the EU is threatening to start an infraction procedure against Italy for failing to swiftly implement the media directive. At the same time, other press reports say the restrictions in the Italian bill would likely violate the EU e-commerce directive. - - - - - - - ROME 00000125 003 OF 003 COMMENT - - - - - - - 12. (C) In official statements the government insists the bill is in no way intended to stifle free speech. Opponents are vocal and using alarmist language, but outside of telecom industries their numbers appear to be small. There has been no visible public outrage, and even Beppe Grillo, a public personality usually outspoken about government regulation, especially that involving the Internet, has said very little. 13. (C) After Berlusconi was attacked in Milan in December and a Facebook fan page for his attacker quickly amassed fans, the GOI expressed the need for regulation of social networking sites. At that time, Romani said the government would work with ISPs and sites to develop a method of self-regulation and that there would be no attempt to legislate internet content. Despite Romani's prior statements, this bill appears to have been written to give the government enough leeway to block or censor any Internet content it deems defamatory or to be encouraging criminal activity. 14. (C) For years, the USG has urged the GOI to take action to protect copyrighted material on the Internet, in particular encouraging the establishment of clear notice-and-takedown procedures and cooperation among rights holders and ISPs to prevent illegal filesharing. Italy has done very little. Now, this bill skips over collaboration, and suddenly moves directly to very stern regulation. In light of its reluctance to take action on this issue in the past, and also given the many commercial advantages that this law appears to give Mediaset and state TV, the GOI claim that Internet provisions of this law are aimed at copyright protection alone are suspect. 15. (C) In all liklihood, if this bill were to become law as it is currently written, little would change immediately in the way Internet sites operate in Italy, and the average 11th grader uploading video to his blog would never be targeted for legal action. It would, however, provide a basis for legal actions against media operators that proved to be commercial or political competition for government figures. Over the last three years we have seen several GOI efforts to exert control over the Internet, including one infamous effort to require bloggers to obtain GOI journalism licenses. 16. (C) Advocates of Internet freedom have repeatedly warned us that Italy's traditional elites -- on both sides of the political spectrum -- are very uncomfortable with the Internet's ability to bypass the traditional media that they control. Becasue this new bill seems to address these kinds of concerns, and because it also serves Berlusconi's business interests, it is conceivable that this seemingly improbable legislation might actually come into force in Italy. We note that officers from SKY have told us that Deputy GOI Minister Romani (for whom the new bill is named) has been leading efforts within the GOI to help Berlusconi's Mediaset and to put SKY at a disadvantage. This represents a familiar pattern: Berslusoni and Mediaset have been using government power in this way ever since the days of Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. In addition, this bill would set precidents that nations such as china could copy or cite as justification for their own crackdowns on free speech. THORNE

Telegrammi da Roma_6

Visto che siamo a 7 giorni dal voto di sfiducia che dovrebbe porre fine all'impero di Silvio III rinfreschiamoci la memoria con un telegramma che nel 2005 dava per finita l'avventura politica del secondo governo del Cainano...sappiamo poi come è andata finire! chi ha orecchie per intendere intenda...

Nel Telegramma si parla del pistolero Silvio e degli otto punti persi secondo l'ultimo sondaggio dal suo governo, della crisi economica e dai mugugni di Casini e soci...
(nella foto un immagine idilliaca dell'Italia)

ID:	43645
Date:	2005-10-26 10:29:00
Origin:	05ROME3585
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 003585 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CVIS, IT, ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS, ITALIAN POLITICS, IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM BERLUSCONI'S OCTOBER 31 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT Classified By: Ambassador Spogli, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d). XXXXXXXXXXXX 2. (C) Berlusconi will seek: (a) presidential statements of support on shared values; (b) support for extending in 2005 the UN mandate on Iraq; (c) tangible progress on a plan to enhance Iraqi security capabilities and allow a coordinated drawdown of Italian forces; and (d) the President's possible intervention to waive or delay new passport requirements for continued Italian participation in the Visa Waiver Program. We should: (a) offer appropriate praise for Italy's foreign policy support without jeopardizing our relationship with Prodi; and (b) engage Berlusconi on Russia and Iran. End Summary XXXXXXXXXXXX

Telegrammi da Roma_5

Questo telegramma inviato da Mosca racconta della romantica storia d'amore di cui sono protagonisti Vladeo e Silvietta...

la gelosia dell'ambasciatore yankee è tale che decide di spifferare al Dipartimento di Stato che i due picconcini comunicano costantemente attraverso una HOT LINE
(nella foto)

brrrrr che brividi!!!

ID:	247415
Date:	2010-02-05 10:39:00
Origin:	10MOSCOW266
Source:	Embassy Moscow
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:	09MOSCOW1273 10STATE8676
Destination:	VZCZCXRO7351 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #0266/01 0361039 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 051039Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6162 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000266 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, S/EEE MORNINGSTAR, EUR/WE, INR DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2035 TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, PINR, RS, IT SUBJECT: (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX DIPLOMAT ON ENERGY INTERESTS, PUTIN-BERLUSCONI LINK (C-RE9-02730) REF: A. STATE 8676 B. 09 MOSCOW 1273 Classified By: Econ MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ---------------------------- PUTIN-BERLUSCONI DIRECT LINK ---------------------------- 1. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told us during a February 4 lunch that his Embassy and his Foreign Ministry often only learn of conversations between PM Berlusconi and PM Putin after the fact, and with little detail or background. He expressed frustration about the PMs' "direct line," which sometimes leaves the Embassy in the dark. He said if there is action to be taken, the cabinet secretary will instruct the Foreign Ministry or the Embassy without providing any background, and only note that Berlusconi and Putin had agreed on whatever the action item is. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that while the close relationship is not ideal from the bureaucracy's perspective and more detrimental than beneficial, it can be useful at times. He cited the case of the sale to Gazprom by Italian energy giant ENI of its 20% share in Gazprom's oil subsidiary Gazpromneft. He said Gazprom had insisted on paying far below the market price, but that it ultimately paid the market price after Berlusconi weighed in with Putin. ------------ ENI AND ENEL ------------ 2. (C/NF) In response to our comment that ENI's Moscow Representative, Ernesto Ferlenghi, won't meet with us, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Ferlenghi "for some reason" doesn't like to meet with foreign diplomats. (Note: We had a very open and friendly meeting with Ferlenghi about two years ago, but ever since, he has deflected our requests for a meeting. See also ref B. End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes Ferlenghi may have a directive from ENI headquarters to refer foreign governments to ENI's Rome-based international governmental affairs director. While XXXXXXXXXXXX was noting that he talks to Ferlenghi daily, his cell phone rang -- it was Ferlenghi. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that although major projects such as the proposed South Stream gas pipeline gain the most attention, ENI's main business in Russia is "buying gas." 3. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Italian Embassy is organizing a visit by a trade and investment delegation to Novy Urengoi, the Yamal region city that is a project site of Severenergia, an upstream joint-venture between Gazprom, ENI, and Italy's Enel. Gazprom bought a controlling stake in Severenergia from ENI and Enel, which had set up Severenergia to purchase some of the assets of the former Yukos oil company at its bankruptcy auction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in addition to its investment in Severenergia, Enel also has approximately $6 billion invested in the Russian electricity sector and may raise its investment in that sector to $9 billion. ------------------------------ SOUTH STREAM AND SAMSUN-CEYHAN ------------------------------ 4. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that ENI CEO Paolo Scaroni and "we" (presumably the Italian government) have regular contact with Russian DPM and "Energy Czar" Igor Sechin. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that lately the discussions relate to an explicit business link between South Stream and the proposed Samsun-Ceyhan Turkish oil pipeline, of which ENI is the operating partner. He explained that ENI, and its Turkish partner (which he said is Turkish PM Erdogan's son-in-law) need Russian oil to make Samsun-Ceyhan a reality, while Gazprom needs Turkish cooperation to move ahead on South Stream. ------- COMMENT ------- 5. (C/NF) On major issues, it seems that Russian-Italian MOSCOW 00000266 002 OF 002 economic relations are directed by PMs who have a direct line to each other as well as control over some of the largest assets of their respective economies. To whatever end they direct those assets, it is likely they are not doing so based solely on commercial or rate-of-return calculations. As our contact himself acknowledged -- "it seems that everything that happens at the lower levels is just for show." Beyrle

Telegrammi da Roma_4

Anche l'ambasciatore a Roma non ha niente di meglio da fare che parlare di prostitute e viagraparty all night long in quel di Palazzo Grazioli.



Le Feste Selvagge di Papi per l'ambasciata americana lasciano il segno...Letta e Cantoni sono preoccupati.

ID:	231600
Date:	2009-10-27 15:17:00
Origin:	09ROME1187
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:	09ROME1143
Destination:	VZCZCXRO1363 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #1187/01 3001517 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 271517Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2810 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3861 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0293 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 4074
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001187 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2026 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IT SUBJECT: ITALY: SCANDALS TAKING TOLL ON BERLUSCONI'S PERSONAL AND POLITICAL HEALTH REF: ROME 1143 ROME 00001187 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Though PM Berlusconi's parliamentary majority is strong, and nobody is yet willing to predict his political demise, a growing list of scandals, adverse court decisions and health issues have weakened him and led some erstwhile Berlusconi allies to begin hedging their bets on his political longevity. In a souring political environment, talk of conspiracy theories often trumps real political debate and distracts the Berlusconi government from pursuing, or even developing, a coherent political agenda. END SUMMARY. PRIVATE MATTERS WEIGHING ON BERLUSCONI 2. (SBU) After a long hot spring and summer of personal and professional scandals, PM Berlusconi, returning from the August recess appeared briefly rejuvenated by a successful G8 summit and continued popularity with his base. However, the first of several blows fell on October 7 when a civil court ruled that the Berlusconi family's flagship business, Finnivest, must pay a rival company Euro 750 million for damages occurred as a result of a Finnivest lawyer bribing a judge in a decision involving both companies. Two days later, the Italian Constitutional Court concluded that one of the Berlusconi government's first pieces of legislation, a 2008 law postponing criminal investigations against Berlusconi and other senior officials, was unconstitutional (REFTEL). As a result, Italian magistrates have, once again, taken up several long-standing criminal cases against Berlusconi, with one case due to resume as early as November. 3. (C/NF) Two officials personally and professionally close to Berlusconi, in separate conversations with the Embassy, recently described the Prime Minister in strikingly similar terms. Council of Ministers U/S Gianni Letta told the Ambassador October 23 that Berlusconi is "physically and politically weak," describing the normally hyperactive Berlusconi as "not energetic." Longtime Berlusconi friend, Senate Defense Committee President Giampiero Cantoni, told an Embassy political officer October 22 that, "we are all worried about his health," noting that Berlusconi has fainted three times in public in recent years and that his medical tests have come back "a complete mess." Cantoni said Berlusconi's frequent late nights and penchant for partying hard mean he does not get sufficient rest. The Italian press reported October 27 that Berlusconi has a mild case of scarlet fever, which he reportedly contracted from his grandchild. (Note: Berlusconi dozed off briefly during the Ambassador's initial courtesy call in September, and looked distracted and tired at an October 19 event attended by the Ambassador. End note.) 4. (C/NF) Cantoni termed Berlusconi overwhelmed with private concerns. He noted that Berlusconi has felt alienated from his family since his wife, Veronica Lario, set off a public uproar by publishing an open letter last spring asking for a divorce and accusing the 74-year old PM of consorting with minors. Lario is reportedly asking for fifty percent of Berlusconi's personal assets plus Euro 100 million in yearly support. At the same time, according to Cantoni, Berlusconi is afraid he will need to liquidate important business assets to make the Euro 750 million payment ordered by a civil court. Cantoni added that a Palermo-based mafia investigation involving another longtime Berlusconi ally and confidant already convicted of ties to organized crime could turn into a damaging public spectacle. LEADING TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES 5. (C/NF) A number of Embassy contacts have described a political environment dominated by conspiracy theories. In the wake of the two court rulings, Berlusconi accused President of the Republic Napolitano of working against him and lashed out emotionally against the judicial system, in general. Letta told the Ambassador that Berlusconi's outburst had led to "frosty" relations with Napolitano and said the episode has made him appear weak. Several PdL officials have hinted darkly to us that "institutional forces" are trying to unseat Berlusconi. (Note: In Italian political parlance, "institutional forces" can serve to mean one of many groups operating and wielding influence behind the scenes: business groups, intelligence services, freemasons, the Vatican, the magistracy, the United States, etc. While Italians are notably conspiracy-minded, their paranoia -- at least as far as Italian domestic politics go -- has historically been well-founded. End note.) ROME 00001187 002.2 OF 003 6. (C/NF) Cantoni confided that Berlusconi believes the Italian intelligence services might have deliberately entrapped him in his alleged affair involving a minor. During Cantoni's conversation with the Embassy political officer, Berlusconi called the senator to confide that an arrest was imminent of four Italian Carabinieri believed to be blackmailing the Lazio regional governor with a sex-tape. (Note: The story of the Lazio governor and a transsexual prostitute exploded in the press a few days later. End note.) Cantoni told the Embassy officer that this case has convinced Berlusconi that he cannot trust his own intelligence services. Separately, on October 21, Northern League leader Umberto Bossi, commenting on Berlusconi's troubles, told the Ambassador that organized crime figures had probably set the trap for Berlusconi on some of the sex scandals, but that nobody denies that Berlusconi willingly went for the bait. 7. (C/NF) In a replay of the foreign press-induced scandals of last spring and summer, a London Times article accusing Italian troops in Afghanistan of paying off Taliban insurgents sparked speculation in and out of the GoI that the USG might have leaked the information to discredit the Berlusconi government. Moreover, it is not uncommon these days for PdL politicians to speculate-- via the press or even directly to Embassy officers-- that the new U.S. administration would like to see the Berlusconi government fall; some even believe the USG is actively undermining Berlusconi. The Ambassador recently probed Letta and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini to determine whether they shared this belief; both averred that they thought Berlusconi's relationship with the US administration was strong. AND PALACE INTRIGUE 8. (C/NF) One of Berlusconi's would-be heirs, Chamber of Deputies President Gianfranco Fini, picked one of his periodic fights with Berlusconi in September, ostensibly over euthanasia and living wills, but the real issues were Berlusconi's non-democratic leadership style inside the party and the growing weight of the Northern League (LN). More recently, the powerful Minister of Economy, Giulio Tremonti, has openly challenged Berlusconi on fiscal policy, leading to talk simultaneously of his possible resignation as well as the possibility he was seeking to eventually succeed Berlusconi. In response to a direct question from the Ambassador, Gianni Letta said there was a small, but unlikely, possibility the government could fall. Cantoni told us Tremonti, Fini and former Minister of Interior Giuseppe Pisanu are laying the groundwork for a post-Berlusconi succession struggle but felt the government remained stable for the time being. AS WELL AS ERRATIC DECISIONS 9. (C/NF) Media mogul Berlusconi might be gaffe-prone when speaking off the cuff, but he has historically shown himself astute at strategic messaging. Those skills were noticeably absent in a recent incident which provoked both criticism and head-scratching from Berlusconi friend and foe alike. Ahead of a three-day trip to Russia to celebrate Vladimir Putin's birthday in mid-October, Berlusconi put out a press line that the visit was a "strictly private affair." This announcement was met with disbelief and some mockery. Adding to the mystery, however, the day before his departure, Berlusconi canceled his participation in the state visit of Jordan's King Abdullah of Jordan, staying in Milan with the explanation that he was feeling under the weather. Berlusconi, who prides himself on his personal relationships with key Middle East interlocutors thus, unavoidably, left the impression that, in choosing private fun over statecraft, he was husbanding his flagging energies for a blow-out party at Putin's private dacha. With the further news that Berlusconi was accompanied on the trip solely by Valentino Valentini, an unofficial intermediary/bagman who serves as Berlusconi's interpreter, Italy's political class openly questioned whether Berlusconi was going to Russia principally because the scrutiny of his private time by Italian and foreign photographers had made parties in Italy too risky for the time being. COMMENT 10. (C/NF) Sex scandals, criminal investigations, family problems and financial concerns appear to be weighing heavily on Berlusconi's personal and political health, as well as on ROME 00001187 003.2 OF 003 his decision-making ability. It is too early to begin speculating about Berlusconi's political demise, and Berlusconi has a well-known knack for rebounding. However, though most are trying hard not to be too obvious about it, some of Berlusconi's own lieutenants have apparently decided it is not too early to begin laying the groundwork for "il dopo," as Italians call the potential post-Berlusconi era. In this souring political environment, conspiracy theories have all but supplanted serious political debate. Septel will address the implications of Berlusconi's fortunes on how we do business with the government. END COMMENT THORNE

Telegrammi da Roma_3

Continuiamo con la serie dei telegrammi Russi proponendo una bella leccata di culo dell'imperatore Nano Magno riverente e prono alla corte dello Zar di tutte la Russe

Ecco come presenta all'ambasciatore Ammerigano il suo amico Vladimiro:

ID:	226129
Date:	2009-09-21 11:31:00
Origin:	09ROME1077
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXRO0387 PP RUEHSL DE RUEHRO #1077 2641131 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211131Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2683 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0530 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4609 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0229 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3801 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4010 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3043 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001077 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NATO, IT, AF, RU, IR SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI REAFFIRMS AFGHAN COMMITMENT DURING AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador Thorne's first call on PM Berlusconi, the PM appeared elated by President Obama's decision on missile defense; reaffirmed Italy's commitment to the Afghanistan mission, despite the fatal September 17 attack on an Italian convoy, while noting the need for a "transition strategy"; agreed on the need for firm allied unity in the face of Iranian intransigence; and said Italy would support Chicago's bid to host the Olympic Games in 2016. End Summary. 2. (C) Amb. Thorne, accompanied by DCM Dibble, paid his first call on PM Berlusconi on September 18. The PM, accompanied by U/S Gianni Letta, Russia advisor Valentino Valentini, and NSA-equivalent Bruno Archi, thanked the Ambassador for U.S. condolences over the previous day's lethal VBIED attack on an Italian military convoy in Kabul. Berlusconi noted that he had been up almost the entire night in Council of Ministers deliberations dealing with the aftermath of the incident (note: the deaths have provoked a huge emotional reaction in the Italian public and press, and September 21 has been declared a day of national mourning in honor of the 6 killed and four wounded). He reiterated the themes he has sounded publicly in the past 24 hours about the need for Italy and other allies to stay committed to the mission despite this and other attacks, thus his public call for a "transition strategy," not an "exit strategy," as some politicians (most notably the leader of the Lega Nord, the junior partner in Berlusconi's own governing coalition) had demanded since the attack. 3. (C) Berlusconi appeared elated over the President's September 17 announcement that the U.S. would substantially revise missile defense plans for Europe. Saying he had considered former Secretary of State Rice a friend, the PM said he had nonetheless told her he disagreed strongly with her over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations to Poland and the Czech Republic; Berlusconi termed it a return to the Cold War. The PM offered a long and familiar discourse on (in his eyes) Putin's many fine qualities as a leader, terming President Medvedev somewhat dismissively Putin's "apprentice." He asserted that under former President Bush and now with President Obama he had managed to play a useful, mediating role in U.S.-Russian relations, due to his exceptionally close relationship with Putin, the real center of power in Russia. 4. (C) On Iran, Berlusconi agreed with Amb. Thorne's call for close U.S.-Italian coordination, citing the most recent IAEA report on Iran's apparent readiness to build a nuclear weapon and saying that stronger efforts by the international community would be needed in the coming months. The Ambassador briefed the PM on an undertaking by Paolo Scaroni, CEO of Italian Energy Parastatal ENI, to U/S Burns to convey formally to the USG all current ENI projects in Iran, as well as those ENI has suspended (at GOI/USG request) for the time being. Amb. noted that the Italian power company Edison, on the other hand, had recently told us that, GOI urgings to the contrary, it was proceeding with a major project in Iran. Berlusconi expressed surprise, and dismissed the notion that Edison would proceed (note: DCM followed up separately with Letta and Archi to relay details of recent exchanges with Edison). 5. (SBU) Responding to the Ambassador's request that Italy support the city of Chicago's bid to host the 2016 Olympics, Berlusconi indicated that Italy was prepared to support Chicago. Since Rome is considering a bid for the 2020 games, Berlusconi said, Italy would want to see a non-European city win the 2016 competition, since the OIC would not support back-to-back hosting of the Olympics by London, Madrid and Rome. THORNE

Telegrammi da Roma_2

All'osteria numero dueeee
all'osteria numero dueeee



Nel secondo telegramma Ilaria Clinton (nella foto dopo una sbronza), forse memore di certe vicenze personali, e mossa da un insospettabile sentimento di gelosia, chiede notizie più chiare, all'ambasciata italiana, sulla relazione tra il nano più alto degli ultimi 120 anni e il nuovo Zar di tutte le Russe (o la Russe...) Vladimiro bel Pitin.

ID:	246008
Date:	2010-01-28 14:27:00
Origin:	10STATE8676
Source:	Secretary of State
Classification:	SECRET//NOFORN
Dunno:	10MOSCOW1273 10ROME1409 10ROME948 10ROME97
Destination:	VZCZCXYZ0003 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #8676 0281434 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 281427Z JAN 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6960 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 3925
S E C R E T STATE 008676 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2035 TAGS: PINR, EINV, ENRG, ETRD, PGOV, PREL, IT, RS SUBJECT: (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS (C-RE9-02730) REF: A. ROME 000097 B. ROME 000948 C. ROME 001409 D. MOSCOW 001273 Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS 1. (C) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EXCELLENT REFS ON ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC, AS POST'S TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT. BECAUSE ITALY IS ONE OF RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC PARTNERS IN EUROPE, THERE IS SIGNIFICANT POLICYMAKER INTEREST IN ITALY'S POLICIES TOWARDS RUSSIA AND THE FACTORS DRIVING THOSE POLICIES. ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE BETWEEN ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER SILVIO BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN PRIME MINSTER VLADIMIR PUTIN OR RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DIMITRY MEDVEDEV, AND ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. 2. (C) THERE IS ALSO CONTINUED POLICYMAKER INTEREST IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE ENERGY SECTOR. ITALY IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF EUROPEAN ENERGY AND CONTINUES TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS DEALS WITH GAZPROM, THE RUSSIAN ENERGY GIANT. ENI, ITALY'S PARTIALLY STATE-OWNED ENERGY CONGLOMERATE, IS GAZPROM'S LARGEST PARTNER IN ITS EFFORTS TO STREAMLINE THE SOUTH STREAM PIPELINE, AND WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN HOW THE TWO COMPANIES ARE OPERATING TOGETHER. U.S. POLICYMAKERS ALSO REMAIN INTERESTED IN ITALY'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION AND THE RESTART OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ANALYSTS WELCOME ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THESE TOPICS, AS TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT. A. (U) FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICY: 1) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIAN PM VLADIMIR PUTIN AND ITALIAN PM SILVIO BERLUSCONI. WHAT PERSONAL INVESTMENTS, IF ANY, DO THEY HAVE THAT MIGHT DRIVE THEIR FOREIGN OR ECONOMIC POLICIES? 2) (C) WHAT FACTORS ARE DRIVING ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH RUSSIA? 3) (C) HOW DO ITALIAN LEADERS VIEW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. HAVE ITALIAN POLITICAL OR BUSINESS LEADERS INFLUENCED RUSSIAN POLICY AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS, AND IF SO, HOW? B. (U) ENERGY POLICY: 1) (C) WHAT ARE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' AND ENI OFFICIALS' VIEWS ON ITALY'S ENERGY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND THE SOUTH STREAM PROJECT? WHERE DOES ITALIAN ENERGY POLICY CONVERGE WITH RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY, ESPECIALLY REGARDING LIBYA AND THE BALKANS? 2) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENI EXECUTIVES, INCLUDING CEO SCARONI, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY PM BERLUSCONI AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 3) (C) PLEASE PROVIDE EXAMPLES, IF POSSIBLE, OF ANY INSTANCES WHERE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MADE DECISIONS TO BENEFIT ITALIAN BUSINESS OR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF POLITICAL CONCERNS ABOUT ENERGY POLICY. 3. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-02730 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON

Telegrammi da Roma_1

Muro di Cani ti regala i telegrammi pubblicati da Wikileaks spediti dall'ambasciata statunitense a Roma verso il Dipartimento di Stato USA...buona lettura!

Nel primo l'ambasciata critica pesantemente il Ministro degli Esteri italiano Franco Frattaglie (nella foto mentre tenta di mettersi un dito nell'occhio) per non avere preso posizione alcuna rispetto alla situazione in Georgia.
Conflitto Russia-Georgia

ID:	165759
Date:	2008-08-12 14:52:00
Origin:	08ROME1021
Source:	Embassy Rome
Classification:	SECRET//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXRO8705 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHRO #1021/01 2251452 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 121452Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0755 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0317 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0678 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0420 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0977 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4436 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 3160 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 9509 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 3306 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0454 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2955 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0904
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 001021 NOFORN SIPDIS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IT SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 4-10 TRIP TO ITALY ROME 00001021 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C/NF) Summary. Mr. Vice President, Silvio Berlusconi's government has worked hard over its first months in office to regain its position as our best ally in continental Europe. Your September 4-10 visit comes as the Berlusconi government reconvenes for what promises to be an important legislative session. Although it has a strong electoral mandate, the government needs to take decisive steps to revitalize the economy and reduce budget deficits. Your visit presents an opportunity to build upon the President's June visit by encouraging the Berlusconi government to remain focused on much-needed economic and institutional reforms, while maintaining the defense capabilities and commitments that are essential to bilateral and NATO interests. 2. (C/NF) Berlusconi's government has taken pains to work with us, but mandatory budget cuts mean we will need to coordinate on the specifics. Berlusconi relaxed geographic caveats for Italian ISAF forces, but we are monitoring progress on bringing promised police and border guard trainers into the field. Berlusconi and Foreign Minister Frattini have been extremely cooperative on Iran, even if Italy has not been invited to join the P5 1 as they hoped. Coordination has been very good on Lebanon and Israel, though we have not yet made the same type of progress on trans-Atlantic relations with Russia. You will also be meeting President Giorgio Napolitano, who continues to exercise his authority with conscientiousness and to be a stabilizing force in the government -- even when it makes him unpopular among his colleagues on the center-left. End Summary. Berlusconi Government Embarks on Challenging Autumn - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. (C/NF) Over his first hundred days in office, Berlusconi delivered concrete results on election promises. His coalition's solid majorities in both chambers of parliament allowed the swift adoption of wide-ranging laws on domestic security and the budget. Berlusconi intends to pass significant judicial reforms and devolve more fiscal powers to the regions between now and the end of the year. Politicians of all stripes agree that deep institutional reform is essential. But initial hopes of cross-aisle cooperation have faded, as the weakened opposition has signaled its intent to protest budget cuts and changes to the dysfunctional and deeply politicized judicial system. An Ally in Economic Decline -- We Can Help Change This - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. (SBU) A G8 member and one of the world's largest economies, Italy's influence is threatened by perennially slow economic growth. Its economy has grown a full percentage point slower than the EU average this decade. A burdensome bureaucracy, corruption, organized crime, a low birth rate, severe labor market rigidity, a weak educational system, and a business culture that rewards connections instead of merit are all factors contributing to stagnation - a condition that bedeviled both the Prodi government and the Berlusconi government that preceded it. The slow growth that results from this mess seriously threatens Italy's ability to be the kind of "boots on the ground" ally that we want it to be. 5. (U) To address this economic threat to our alliance, in 2006 the Embassy launched the Partnership for Growth, an ambitious, multi-faceted effort to spur economic dynamism by helping move research to market, grow risk capital markets, support innovation by strengthening intellectual property ROME 00001021 002.2 OF 005 rights, and create Italian entrepreneurial role models. Through our Fulbright Business Exchange and Student Training (BEST) scholarship program we send young Italian scientist-entrepreneurs to Silicon Valley for six months of total immersion in the U.S. entrepreneurial environment. They come back energized, ready to do in their country what we have done in ours. Of particular note, almost all costs are covered by donations from Italian companies. We have also brought many of the top minds in U.S. innovation to Italy, to share their ideas on how countries can make progress. We have created dozens of new, web-based avenues for communication and idea-sharing between the U.S. and Italy. And through more than 200 events over the last two years, we have made the Italian elite understand what needs to be done to put their country on the path to prosperity. 6. (U) We have made tremendous progress. We have strengthened the hands of those Italians who want to move their country forward, and in doing so we have greatly improved Italian perceptions of the United States. I am happy to report that because of our Partnership for Growth, in Italy, the words "innovation" "growth" and "entrepreneurship" are now usually associated with the United States of America. Maintaining a Common Stand on Iran - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. (S/NF) We have made great advances in moving Italy solidly into our camp on Iran. The Berlusconi government has cooperated fully on EU efforts to apply additional financial measures against Tehran, despite Italy's disappointment with not being included in the P5-plus-1. Their concerns have been eased somewhat by Quint pre-meeting consultations, but they worry that this mechanism is too informal and ad hoc to keep them properly informed. Italian adherence to sanctions has always been complicated by their substantial commercial interests in Iran, but we will continue to monitor their economic activities and discourage further energy sector investments. Sustaining Italian support for sanctions and the P5-plus-1 negotiations may depend on keeping up early and high-level dialogue. Not Seeing Eye-To-Eye on Russia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. (S/NF) Italy's relationship with Russia could become a point of friction if Italy continues to insist that Russia's demands on Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and Missile Defense get a fair hearing in transatlantic and international fora. We have advised them that taking a soft line on Russian actions against Georgia could damage their credibility. We have also become concerned by a growing sympathy for Medvedev's calls for a new security framework to supersede NATO, OSCE, and CFE. You can let Berlusconi know that public endorsement of Russia's plans only serves to weaken the alliance. 9. (S/NF) The presence of a strong communist party and a history of leftist governments in Italy gave Russia a degree of influence not seen in any other Western European country. More recently, a commercial dependence on Russia, particularly in the energy sector, and a close personal relationship between Putin and Berlusconi based on mutual commercial interests and Berlusconi's preference for dealing with assertive world leaders appear to be greater motivating factors in Italy's relations with Russia. Need for Energy Diversification - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10. (C/NF) Compared to EU countries further north, Italy is ROME 00001021 003.2 OF 005 less dependent on Russia for energy, especially natural gas. Geography gives Italy access to more resources than other EU countries, including North African energy. There are already natural gas pipelines from Libya and Algeria to Italy. An Algeria-Sardinia-Italy pipeline is being planned. While Italy's North African connections seem to be good news in terms of energy security, ENI has recently given Gazprom access to North African energy resources, in exchange for increased access to Siberian gas fields. Italy hopes to make increased use of Liquid Natural Gas, but local environmental concerns have slowed the construction of regasification plants. The GOI claims to share our concerns, but in fact takes comfort in what it perceives to be its special relationship with Russia. Italy's largest energy company (ENI -- one-third owned by the GOI) is now a major partner of Russia's Gazprom, and is building strategically important pipelines for Gazprom in both the Black Sea and the Baltic. Many believe that ENI actions in furtherance of its own commercial goals are also helping Russia tighten its grip on Western Europe's energy supply. 11. (C/NF) At the same time, Italy is taking steps to diversify its sources of energy. Italy, through the Edison Company, is a key player in the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) pipeline. The availability of Azeri natural gas is a key concern, and the EU's Nabbucco pipeline is sometimes seen by the Italians as a competitor for this gas. Reports that Russia is courting Azerbaijan in an attempt to buy all of their gas is a major concern for Italy, since it would mean the end of TGI. Basing and Security Cooperation: A Cornerstone of the Relationship - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12. (C/NF) Italy remains our most important European ally for projecting military power into the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. We have 14,000 U.S. military and DOD civilian personnel and 16,000 of their family members on five Italian bases. The GOI has approved the expansion of the base at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne and the deployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily. Legal challenges to the Vicenza expansion have been dismissed, and both projects are on track. COESPU (Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units), the peacekeeping training center, has graduated over 1,600 officers from 14 countries and has just finished training peacekeepers headed to Darfur. We are now in discussions on locating component commands for AFRICOM and Italy has signaled that it would like to host the overall HQ. Seeking Follow-Through in Afghanistan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13. (C/NF) During the President's June visit, Berlusconi agreed to loosen geographic caveats on Italian ISAF troops and to send approximately 30 additional Carabinieri trainers to support the ANCOP program. Control of Kabul has passed from Italy to France, and Italy intends to transfer a portion of their 1,200 Kabul-based troops to the Herat district. Because of budget constraints and large troop commitments in Lebanon and the Balkans, Italy is likely to reduce the number of troops stationed in Afghanistan. We would like to see Italy maintain as many troops as possible in Afghanistan and to provide more security training and military hardware. Stronger Support for Israel - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14. (C/NF) Berlusconi and Frattini proudly and publicly ROME 00001021 004.2 OF 005 declare their support for Israel, refuse to consider Hamas a potentially constructive partner, and support the formation of an independent, democratic Palestinian state. Frattini pledged additional aid to train and equip Palestinian police, but was unable to do so due to budgetary constraints. Lebanon and Syria: Consultation and Cooperation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15. (C) Italy has consistently offered political, financial and military support to Lebanon, and is the single largest contributor of troops to UNIFIL (over 2,500), which is currently under the command of an Italian general. Berlusconi pledged to maintain and strengthen UNIFIL and FM Frattini joined his Spanish and German counterparts in calling for Syria to halt its uncooperative approach to Lebanon. You can encourage Italy to maintain this engagement, and to join in our efforts to improve security along the Lebanon-Syria border. Expanding Military Cooperation In the Face of Budget Cuts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 16. (C/NF) The Italian MOD signaled that because of budget constraints, it may not meet its commitment to pay for 300 flight hours in the NATO SAC C-17 program. After considerable pressure from SECDEF, the NATO SYG and myself, Italy agreed to postpone their decision until December. We are, however, encouraging them to confirm their participation by mid-September. Your visit is an excellent opportunity to remind them of the importance of this program to the Alliance. 17. (C) Berlusconi is likely to ask for your help on Finmeccanica's acquisition of U.S. defense contractor DRS Technologies, a deal worth $5.2 billion. The Italian government would like to see DRS obtain a Special Security Agreement from DOD, and will encourage a favorable decision by the CFIUS. A recent announcement of intentions by Finmeccanica and Russian Technologies, a Russian para-statal industrial and defense conglomerate, to enter into a cooperation agreement has raised some red flags by CFIUS. Berlusconi may mention Italy's contributions (2 billion euros) to the Joint Strike Fighter program. He may also express interest in the USAF Tanker program rebid; the Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica has partnered with Boeing on the KC767. President Napolitano Has Limited Power, Considerable Influence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18. (C) You will also be meeting with President Giorgio Napolitano. Although his constitutional powers are limited, Napolitano exercises his authority evenhandedly, evidenced by the praise and criticism he receives from both the political left and right. During the collapse of the Prodi government in January 2008, Napolitano was a calming presence in the midst of a political maelstrom. Since Berlusconi took office, Napolitano -- whose roots are in the former Communist Party -- has been careful to tread a legally sound middle ground. He signed the controversial immunity law because it avoids the problems in earlier similar legislation, but also warned the Berlusconi government not to abuse its decree powers and instead to hold full debates on new legislation in Parliament. President Napolitano's seven-year term expires in 2013. Comment - - - - ROME 00001021 005.2 OF 005 19. (C/NF) Mr. Vice President, Italy has great potential to become an even closer partner and ally in addressing some of our most important global interests. But the country is at a critical juncture, and could be faced with institutional and economic failure if difficult domestic choices are not made. Italy's ability to partner with the U.S. will depend above all on the revival of its economy. Your discussions with Berlusconi and key leaders can help this administration to maintain focus and direction on international issues at a point when their interests could be completely absorbed by domestic concerns. 20. (U) We are pleased that you are coming to Italy at this time. I am certain that your visit will make an already robust relationship even stronger. SPOGLI